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RESUMO – O artigo enfoca algumas das caracte-
rísticas da superproteção e extrema indulgência
dos pais com relação aos filhos. Recorrendo a
filósofos da educação, tais como Locke, Rousseau
e Dewey, serão expostos os efeitos corrosivos de 
uma indulgência excessiva sobre o potencial de
felicidade nos filhos, assim como naqueles que
compartilham o mesmo espaço social. Como
esses autores já o mostraram, os pais que se
excedem em indulgência terminam fomentando 
expectativas em seus filhos para além de suas
reais capacidades ou atropelando a sua iniciativa 
ao usurpar a sua independência. Em ambos os 
casos, os pais podam a autonomia de seus filhos
e prejudicam o trabalho necessário ao desenvol-
vimento de hábitos e disposições para planejar e
realizar projetos exequíveis que são fundamentais
para uma felicidade sustentada e duradoura. Para 
simplificar, na medida em que impede o desen-
volvimento de aptidões para alcançar a felicidade 
e desenvolver um senso de responsabilidade 
social, a superproteção e a indulgência excessiva 
se tornam uma forma disfarçada de abuso infan-
til. 
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  ABSTRACT – This article brings to light some of 
the characteristics of the pervasive parental over-
permissiveness and hyper-protectionism that 
unfortunately have made their way into our
culture. With the aid of philosophers of educa-
tion, such as Locke, Rousseau, and Dewey, I
expose the corrosive effects that parental overin-
dulgence has on the potential happiness of those
in their charge, as well as on those who share
their social space. As these philosophers warned
long ago, by overindulging their desires, parents
either overextend their children’s expectations 
well beyond the reality of their capabilities or
they squash their initiative by usurping their
independence. In either case, parents cripple 
their children’s autonomy and thereby detract
from the real work needed to develop habits and 
dispositions necessary to plan and carry out
achievable accomplishments that are integral for 
sustained and enduring happiness. Put more
simply, overindulgence, to the extent this im-
pedes the development of requisite skills for 
achieving happiness and developing a sense of 
social responsibility, becomes a disguised form of
child abuse. 
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It is not in the guise of a hideous monster, 
with horns and tail, that Satan tempts the children of mankind, 
but as an angel of light. 
(Henry George, 1929) 
 
We are, each of us, separate human beings who stand alone within a 
world that simultaneously acts upon and demands action from us. This world, 
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to the extent it is external to us and yet part of us, must be dealt with one 
way or another. The one thing we cannot accept is to do nothing. So, what 
should we do? Beyond mere survival, ideally we seek happiness; we initiate 
activity, create, and thus attempt to meaningfully forge our way through life. 
But seeking happiness, let alone finding it, is no easy task, and perhaps the 
most difficult of all. Yet, it is quite possibly the most rewarding of human en-
deavors. How we find this elusive happiness has a lot to do with our relation-
ship to an environment permeated with people, things, and forces, with which 
we as individuals must necessarily enter into relations. 
Indulge me in the following three assumptions. First, that happiness is es-
sential to human wellbeing. Second, that happiness – achieved in part by an 
ability to set and realize reasonable goals and expectations – is made palpable 
through a sense of accomplishment. This second assumption further implies a 
significant degree of independence, in order to a) formulate our own expecta-
tions based on our personal understanding of our capabilities, and b) to exer-
cise our ability to learn from both our successes and failures. In other words, 
happiness requires that an individual be capable of intelligently directing her 
own life, and be able to do so with full autonomy, that is, as a self-directing 
individual who is able to define, assess, and realize her own goals. 
At the same time, the liberty with which one directs one’s actions must in 
certain respects be kept in check, so as to render such autonomy amenable to 
not only the satisfaction of those ends circumscribed by the needs of said 
individual, but also to serve the interests of satisfying generally those concerns 
that define the social welfare of one’s society. This brings me to my third as-
sumption; that achieving happiness is neither simple nor easy, nor is it a 
purely individual matter. It requires the training and honing of specific capa-
bilities, along with a social sensibility, that together allow one to formulate 
reasonable expectations, especially in an environment of affluence and false 
needs. Among these capabilities is the self-directing wherewithal by means of 
which to discern one’s realistic place and needs within such a powerfully 
influential scheme. 
The unfortunate conclusion I shall draw from these assumptions is not one 
that resolves the issue, but rather one that at least exposes the corrosive ef-
fects that parental overindulgence has on the potential happiness of those in 
their charge, as well as on those who share their social space. By overindulg-
ing their children’s desires, parents either overextend their expectations well 
beyond the reality of their children’s capabilities (over-permissiveness) or they 
squash their initiative by usurping their independence (hyper-protectionism). 
Such overextensions, in either direction, serve to establish a sense of entitle-
ment to unreasonable demands, a false sense of hope, and a crippling of 
autonomy that together detract from the real work needed to develop habits 
and dispositions necessary to plan and carry out achievable accomplishments 
that are integral for sustained and enduring happiness. Put more simply, over-
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achieving happiness and developing a sense of social responsibility, is tanta-
mount to a disguised form of child abuse. 
Signs of our times 
We have certainly come a long way since our days as hunter-gatherers. 
Zone Chefs, a food service company in New York City, offers three fully 
cooked meals delivered each morning to your home. “All you have to do,” 
their radio advertisement urges, “is open your door.” Our ancestors would find 
this truly magical. But today this does not surprise us, given the levels of rela-
tive affluence we enjoy, which allow so many of us to bear more easily the 
twin luxuries of idleness and complacence…“and for an additional 30¢,” the 
digitalized phone-operator voice persuades, “that number can be automati-
cally dialed for you.” 
Apparently, also gone are the days when children needed to draw 
connections between their education and survival.
1 Given the creature 
comforts of many living in contemporary societies such as the United States, 
many of our young may no longer find themselves confronted with the 
ruthlessness of a bygone primitive state. Nonetheless, they are faced with new 
challenges and threats to their survival. Among these are depression, anxiety, 
obesity, unwanted pregnancies, drug addiction, violence, emotional apathy 
and, ironically, the very nurturance that, in attempts to shield them from peril, 
only further threatens their wellbeing by prolonging their dependence on 
others. Lost, alongside this imposed vulnerability, are the virtues of 
perseverance, self-discipline, self-motivation, and self-reliance. 
It is within this contemporary context that we find the redeeming value of 
the many philosophical exhortations to develop and never relinquish our 
personal responsibility in the pursuit of happiness. Reaching happiness, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau recommends, is only possible when we cease to reach 
beyond our selves, that is, when we cease to define our selves in relation to 
unnecessary desires or simply learn to desire only what is necessary. But, 
today, this is easier said than done. That the desire for things seems to far 
exceed their affordability is easily forgotten within a culture where gratification 
and status are purchased on credit.
2 
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Comparing a “natural” to a “civilized” state of affairs, Rousseau writes: "In 
fact, the real source of all those differences is that the savage lives within 
himself; whereas civilized man, constantly outside himself, knows only how to 
live in the opinion of others; and it is merely from their judgment of him that 
he derives the consciousness of his own existence.”
3 Philosopher Alain de 
Botton likewise argues that in the modern world, “The attentions of others 
matter to us because we are afflicted by a congenital uncertainty as to our 
own value, as a result of which affliction we tend to allow others’ appraisals to 
play a determining role in how we see ourselves; our sense of identity is held 
captive by the judgments of those we live among.”
4 As if this dependence 
were not enough, a consumption-driven democracy introduces a shared 
discomfort and disease that no longer comes from the threat of scarcity, but 
instead now comes from the self-inflicted pressure to keep our desires in pace 
with the empty promise that all of us may equally attain the same things. De 
Botton chronicles this social malady, which he euphemistically labels ‘status 
anxiety’: 
Insofar as advanced societies supply their members with historically elevated in-
comes, they appear to make us wealthier. But in truth, their net effect may be to 
impoverish us, because by fostering unlimited expectations, they keep open per-
manent gaps between what we want and what we can afford, between who we 
might be and who we really are. The price we have paid for expecting to be so 
much more than our ancestors is a perpetual anxiety that we are far from being all 
we might be.
5 
Because we assign a saleable price to all things – within a system of 
presumably free exchanges – everything is believed to be within our reach. 
Even those things we cannot reach because we lack the real means by which 
to do so. De Botton, who credits Rousseau for bringing this ‘status anxiety’ to 
our attention, suggests that with the greater availability of commercial goods – 
appropriately dubbed ‘objects of desire’ within a culture driven by 
consumption – there is an expansion of desire. Keeping pace with what we 
are, at least in principle, able to attain or what we convince ourselves is within 
our grasp, gives us something new to worry about—“A worry so pernicious as 
to be capable of ruining extended stretches of our lives; that we are in danger 
of failing to conform to the ideals of success laid down by our society.”
6 
Interestingly enough, even Plato’s criticism of democracy proves to be 
quite prophetic. The irresponsibility on the part of parents who neglect to 
educate their children in matters of virtue generates a recipe for the debacle 
that is democracy. Greed, coupled with luxury, promotes physical and intellec-
tual laziness, and diminishes all moral incentive for exercising rational self-
                             
3   Rousseau (1967), p. 245 (emphasis mine). 
4   De Botton (2004), p. 8. 
5   Ibid. pp. 43-44 
6   Ibid. pp. vii-viii.   73
control in the service of mutual social interests. This opens the door to ex-
travagant desires which, “in the end, seize the citadel of the young child’s 
soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and 
true discourses.”
7 When democracy is viewed as nothing more than a great 
equalizer, as equal powers and freedoms are granted to all and where all de-
sires and pleasures carry equal weight, moral chaos ensues. Plato warns of 
how the demos “euphemistically denominate insolence ‘good breeding,’ li-
cense ‘liberty,’ prodigality ‘magnificence,’ and shamelessness ‘manly spirit’.”
8 
The democratic individual pursues pleasure for pleasure’s sake and, therefore, 
does not discern between what is beneficial and potentially harmful. 
Such is Plato’s democratic individual: selfish, greedy, irrational, and in-
temperate. Lacking the rational ability and, therefore, the temperance to make 
decisions that benefit even themselves, such selfish democrats cannot exer-
cise the self-control needed to consider the interests of others, let alone empa-
thize with them. A diminished capacity for rationality and self-control can 
have dire consequences within any system of social organization, let alone one 
that must rely so heavily on the deliberations of its citizenry. Add to the mix a 
radical individualism that renders people unwilling, if not outright incapable of 
respect and empathy toward others – both essential requirements for achiev-
ing a democratic way of life. A citizenry that lacks the requisite intelligence 
and self-discipline to make decisions for their own welfare and that of their 
society ought not to be entrusted with the power to make such decisions.
9 
Whereas the exigencies delineated by our physical and environmental 
constraints might normally be enough to check the limits of our freedoms, 
thresholds of autonomy are now calibrated according to a free-market of 
incoherent desires and the superficialities of unsubstantiated capabilities. 
Advertisements continually promise us that we can “have it all.” But what 
exactly are the implications of “having it all?” I’m not quite sure. Nor do I 
think people, including parents, bother to consider what such a proposition 
entails. To begin with, what would I do with “it all?” Where would I put it? 
Unable to realistically accomplish or acquire everything, the freedom to 
everything at our disposal is just as daunting as that giant boulder God is able 
to create, yet we question if even He is able to raise. What is more, a 
democracy narrowly conceived in terms of an economic equal opportunity to 
all things has its effectiveness measured by its ability to service mass 
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consumption. In affluent societies such as ours, this mass interest appears as 
a leveling of heightened tastes – everyone wanting the best, most, and most 
expensive – which, in turn, serves to supplant the autonomy of the 
discriminating consumer. A democracy that merely eulogizes autonomy by 
propagandizing an irresponsibly exaggerated equality, along with its false 
sense of entitlement, upstages the need for informed consent and satisfaction 
of real and realistic needs; it is as empty as the veritable Platonic cave in 
which we find ourselves thrilled – like children who know no better – by the 
illusory honors we bestow upon one another. 
Imbalance – The Nemesis 
A great mistake made in the pursuit of personal fulfillment is allowing 
one’s desire to exceed one’s power to realize what one desires. As Rousseau 
sees it, “A being endowed with senses whose faculties [powers] equaled his 
desires would be an absolutely happy being,” as far as “it is in diminishing the 
excess of the desires over the faculties and putting power and will in perfect 
equality” that true happiness consists.
10 Since one day Emile shall reach adult-
hood, in order to think for himself, be his own person, and find what truly 
fulfills him, he requires a disposition shaped by necessity, rather than the 
opinions of others. If we are not careful to balance our actual capabilities with 
our true needs, we continue to encourage the kinds of gratuitous excesses 
that belie the very nature of what we intend by satisfaction. The pernicious 
anxiety – ironically, born of abundance – arises from our inability to limit our 
wants. De Botton writes, “There are two ways to make a man richer, reasoned 
Rousseau: give him more money or curb his desires. Modern societies have 
done the former spectacularly well, but by continuously whetting appetites 
they have at the same time managed to negate a share of their success.”
11 
Since “the truly free [person] wants only what he can do,”
12 a self-
regulating form of freedom becomes vital for determining what we desire and 
establishing within ourselves the very capability by means of which we 
achieve or acquire what we desire. It is the balance of our capability with 
reasonable desire that ought to calibrate the barometer of our self-restraint. 
Simply stated, Rousseau recommends that what is necessary for the exercise 
of real freedom is that we balance the ambition of our goals with our ability to 
bring said goals to fruition. The individual able to exercise self-control in this 
manner is happiest, since she is less prone to disappointment, so long as she 
does not desire or will more than is necessary, or more than she is capable of 
attaining. In other words, prone to this more realistic approach, she tends 
towards a more effective means of dealing with the possible disappointment 
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that comes from an inability to realize her happiness due to either a deficient 
desire to match her power, or insufficient power to catch up to her desire. 
The imbalance of capability and desire plays out in our culture more sim-
ply. Translated, it refers to the distance we create between our realistic capa-
bilities – what we have the power to realize – and our expectations. Hence, 
the idea is not to deny ourselves expectations; rather, it is to construct these 
in step with our real potential to succeed in our accomplishment of these. One 
ought to continually raise expectations and desires, so long as one’s capabili-
ties keep pace. One might also deliberately establish expectations just beyond 
one’s capabilities, so as to test and challenge the latter. This is precisely what 
we do when we challenge our habits and stretch these towards new under-
standing and ability. Yet, maintaining reasonable expectations, again, helps to 
ensure the prospect of accomplishment. And, we might add to this, because 
our accomplishments arise from our true capabilities, we give substance to 
accomplishments thus earned. 
The imbalance plays out in an interesting manner when it comes to the 
overindulged child. There is a simultaneous increase and diminution of both 
capability and desire. By appeasing the whims of children, we increase their 
thresholds of desire while we diminish their capability. In other words, by 
having things literally handed to children and constantly agreeing to their 
demands, we neither develop their powers, nor do we provide a realistic basis 
for dealing with inevitable frustrations. The imbalance occurs in the other 
direction as well, towards an apparent increase in power, since when children 
are indulged they are, in a skewed sense, being empowered. This false, 
though effective sense of empowerment – power over their caregivers – be-
cause it results in having things done for them, works to diminish their per-
sonal ambition. Children become complacent. And certainly desires or expec-
tations that do not arise from one’s own intelligent assessment of personal 
needs are, in essence, unrealistic, not to mention inauthentic. 
Unable to remove frustrations and tackle adversities on one’s own dimin-
ishes one’s power and desire to overcome these. Just as one’s capability and 
desire for learning to swim are strongly and immediately motivated once 
dropped into the deep end of the swimming pool, never knowing obstacles, 
one never truly understands the implications of imminent challenges, nor the 
necessity of finding personal ways of dealing with these. Rousseau admon-
ishes, “Far from being attentive to protecting Emile from injury, I would be 
most distressed if he were never hurt and grew up without knowing pain. To 
suffer is the first thing he ought to learn and the thing he will most need to 
know.”
13 More easily said, we learn better to balance by experiencing the im-
balance early on and bear the onslaught of adversities, difficulties, and frustra-
tions, just as much as we gain from our victories, which are only possible 
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when we traverse the terrain of what lies before us. Might we not learn about 
adversities and their concomitant victories, that is, successes, and, just as 
importantly, learn how to relate to these, from our earliest exposures to delib-
erately engineered and purposely crafted limits? Might this not be what we 
refer to as ‘learning’ itself? 
In our caregivers’ hands 
This is not to say that parents are entirely responsible for either overindul-
gence or unhappiness, especially within an economic culture that forges its 
very identity by inventing and propagating artificial desires, and then cleverly 
turns these into unnecessary needs. But, making specific reference to parental 
responsibility, Rousseau warned of how overindulging the child causes us to 
step “outside of nature…when [a mother] makes an idol of her child; when she 
increases and nurses his weakness in order to prevent him from feeling it—a 
barbarous precaution.”
14 Overindulgence in the forms of both over-
permissiveness and hyper-protectionism are at the forefront in current child 
rearing literature. Psychologists and educators alike, from television programs 
to periodicals and books, are grappling with the problems brought on by spoil-
ing. Among these, child psychologist Dan Kindlon points to several related 
conditions afflicting today’s overindulged children, including: self-
centeredness, lack of motivation, obesity, and various other problems linked to 
an inability to exercise self-restraint.
15 
Parents who believe they are providing love to their children by constantly 
doing for them, accommodating their every desire and whim, and clearing all 
frustrations from their paths, are in actuality creating greater difficulties for 
them in the future. When anyone acts always on our behalf, we do not – nay – 
we cannot learn to do for ourselves. Almost a hundred years before Rousseau, 
John Locke warned that “parents, by humoring and pampering them when 
little, corrupt the principles of nature in their children, and wonder afterwards 
to taste the bitter waters, when they themselves have poisoned the foun-
tain.”
16 Locke adds to these corruptions – “those ill humors which [parents] 
themselves infused and fomented in their [children]” – the emphasis placed on 
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the clothing and outward appearance of their children, as well as an overin-
dulgence in food and drink that becomes the wealthy and intemperate. Today 
we witness these corruptions manifested, respectively, in the exorbitant pur-
chasing power bestowed upon adolescents, the high incidence of obesity at a 
young age, and binge drinking on college campuses. 
We can find behind these self-destructive behaviors, and their respective 
dispositions, parents who take it upon themselves to exaggerate the thresh-
olds of desire and appetite in their young. A problem even in Locke’s day, he 
counseled that “contrary to the ordinary way…the first thing [children] should 
learn to know, should be that they were not to have anything because it 
pleased, but because it was thought fit for them.”
17 Ill equipped to make ap-
propriate decisions for themselves, children inevitably follow the lead of their 
parents. But, it appears, many parents have lost touch with their children’s 
real needs – not an improbable result of living within a society tailored to ac-
commodate every desire.
18 Spoiling is bound to be especially pernicious within 
a culture permeated by mass-marketed goods. Under these circumstances, 
artificial desires condition adult and young alike to rely on extrinsic and mate-
rial forms of motivation. 
The sheer pervasiveness of such potential rewards makes exercising self-
restraint a daunting task even for parents, who, through their example – for 
better or worse – shape the desires of their young. The ubiquity of material 
rewards overwhelms parents, who then put into practice the ill-conceived 
principle that children’s needs are best regarded by providing indiscriminately 
for their desires. When parents give in to their children’s every desire, they 
end up reversing the order of authority in the home. Instead of parents taking 
the lead in the development of their children’s habits and establishing in them 
reasonable thresholds of desire, they try to befriend their children early on, and 
only later discipline them when it is too late. 
Now, consider happiness – something sages from time immemorial have 
suggested is found within. Yet, for various reasons, we continue to convince 
our young and ourselves that it is things outside ourselves that bring us hap-
piness. As might be expected in a society that democratizes consumption, the 
pitiable proposition – that it is things that make our lives meaningful and, 
therefore, worth living – would have to follow from such an assumption. We 
thus learn to rely on things external when seeking fulfillment, leading to other 
false sources of happiness, such as the pursuit of power, the desire for fame, 
and solace in narcotics, pharmaceuticals, alcohol, and other self-destructive 
addictions. Perhaps the greatest travesty connected to this conception of our 
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relation to things external is that we seek these, or avoid them once they 
cause direct harm, in place of the happiness we originally set out to experi-
ence. 
Such is the self who lives life in hopes that the world will conform to it, 
and brandish upon it ready-made gifts of happiness and fulfillment neatly 
packaged as objects. Meanwhile, this distraction with things keeps us from 
helping the young develop those difficult skills needed to realize their own 
happiness; and so we instill in them the desire for things, rather than a desire 
for a more authentic source of fulfillment. Through example, we instill in our 
young the want for things, which we shamelessly pass off as the need of 
things. Thus we concede our happiness, fulfillment, and even our freedom, to 
the pursuit and valuing of external rewards and projection of unreasonable 
expectations. To be clear, this is not an attempt to promote some sort of prud-
ish asceticism, according to which we ought to deny children entirely the 
pleasures of rewards. Rather, it is to propose that the very possibility of con-
ceiving that happiness lies within our own capabilities has its chances dimin-
ished in a world so full of things, until individuals become capable of under-
standing that what motivates us to seek happiness is also situated within. 
Coupled with this awareness, there is a need for a palpable sense of free-
dom that is crucial to our development. Rousseau envisions our passion for 
survival as a natural and necessary impetus for learning and the desire to con-
tinue learning. Threats against our survival make present to us the need to 
exercise personal power. The need to secure our survival summons our first 
and most basic expressions of free action and initiative. The necessities of 
survival are our first great teachers in the lessons about the process of learning 
itself – something we must ultimately be motivated to do for ourselves. We 
recognize in Emile fervor for personal sovereignty and a kind of striving to-
wards self-actualization that counters those social forces that too often stifle 
individuality and personal responsibility. 
John Dewey, speaking in Rousseauian terms, stresses the importance of 
liberty in our pursuits. “Liberty for the child” he writes, “is the chance to test 
all impulses and tendencies on the world of things and people in which he 
finds himself,” so that “consequently he becomes acquainted with his world 
and also learns the use and limits of his own powers.”
19 Autonomy is essential 
for moving from an externally imposed to an internally constituted form of self-
control. Only the latter places the onus squarely on the individual. The self-
motivation driving our choices is coupled with self-evaluation, which, in turn, 
incites us to take responsibility for our actions and personally fashion the 
standards by which we will to live our lives.
20 The choice as to which form of 
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control shall win the day remains in the hands of caregivers. But this requires 
us to put our trust in the benevolence of others, in the hopes that our freedom 
is neither too severely limited nor, what is just as serious, that we be fooled 
into believing that we are freer than we really are simply because we are able 
to do what we please or purchase what we like. We may, on the other hand, 
opt for the kind of control that is harvested within – self-control commensurate 
with a freedom so personal that, ironically, only the selfish fool would relin-
quish. 
Here, at least two salient points may be drawn from Rousseau’s emphasis 
on age-appropriate learning.
21 The first has to do with the fact that more and 
more parents today are forcing their children’s development by rushing it. 
Resulting in what Rousseau would describe as a “barbarous education, which 
sacrifices the present to an uncertain future that burdens a child with chains 
of every sort and begins by making him miserable in order to prepare him from 
afar for I know not what pretended happiness which it is to be believed he 
may never enjoy.”
22 Dewey expands further on Rousseau’s sentiment, by con-
necting the need to respect children with the kind of careful attention that 
ought to be given to the process of their development. He writes, “Reverence 
for childhood is identical with reverence for the needs and opportunities of 
growth. Our tragic error is that we are so anxious for the results of growth that 
we neglect the process of growing.”
23 
Gene R. Carter, Executive Director of the Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development (ASCD), places Rousseau’s ideas within a contempo-
rary context by proposing that, “a comprehensive approach to learning must 
recognize that successful young people are knowledgeable, emotionally and 
physically healthy, motivated, civically inspired, prepared for work, self-
sufficient, and ready for the world beyond their own borders.”
24 Carter goes on 
                             
21   According to Rousseau’s own admission, his “whole book is only a constant proof of this funda-
mental principle of education”—that Emile should not learn anything before that stage in which, in 
due time, his capabilities may sustain such lessons. Rousseau, (1979), p. 178. 
22   Ibid. p. 79. During the time in which he writes Emile, Rousseau claims that approximately half of all 
children do not live beyond the age of eight. 
23   Dewey, (1915), p. 213. During Emile’s second stage of development—the age of nature—Rousseau 
admonishes the tutor to “love childhood.” Despite Rousseau’s reminder that, “Nature wants chil-
dren to be children before being men” (Op. cit., 1979, p. 90), current titles by educators and psy-
chologists alike, such as: David Elkind, The Hurried Child: Growing Up Too Fast Too Soon (3
rd ed.). 
Philadelphia: Perseus Publishing (2001); William Crane, Reclaiming Childhood: Letting Children Be 
Children in Our Achievement-Oriented Society. New York: Henry Holt (2003), indicate an awareness 
of the increased pressure being placed on children in preparation for skills and knowledge that they 
may be too young to comprehend. Newspaper articles also reveal disturbing trends. For instance, 
Rita Giordano reports that, “In this age of anxiety over tougher college admissions and schools la-
beled as failing under No Child Left Behind (NCLB), more parents are seeking to raise the bar for 
children at ever-younger ages.” See Rita Giordano, “Too Young for Tests – But Not for Tutors,” The 
Philadelphia Enquirer, May 31, 2005. Witness the transformation of Froebel’s kindergarten into to-
day’s full day “kinder-grind.” See, Amy Dickinson, “Kinder Grind,” Time, November 8, 1999, p. 61. 
24   Gene R. Carter, “A Vision for Public Schools: Academics Is Not Enough,” ASCD, 
http://www.ascd.org/portal/site/ascd/menuitem, retrieved May 2005.   80
to cite a comprehensive report on the positive effects of promoting ethics in 
the high school ranks, in which eight specific strengths of character are out-
lined in efforts to help alleviate the moral morass in our schools. Interestingly 
enough, we see many of the educational outcomes proposed by Rousseau for 
Emile reflected in this report. Included among these are: becoming “socially 
and emotionally adept; self-disciplined; personally responsible moral agents; 
and contributing members of a democratic community.”
25 But how could the 
irresponsible overindulgence in the instruction of our children ever produce 
such virtues? 
And so, we find ourselves in the midst of an interesting tension – a verita-
ble contradiction – between the delicate pampering and overindulgence with 
which parents buffer their children’s errors on the one hand, and the unforgiv-
ing harshness and precision with which we extort their innocence. Children 
are being incapacitated socially, while simultaneously being hurried academi-
cally and athletically.
26 What may appear as two separate problems – overin-
dulging and pushing children into adulthood – is really the same two-headed 
hydra of continued dependence, which, again, impedes the development of 
skills necessary for the pursuit of happiness. 
On the one side, there is the dependence created by the overindulgence 
of desires, to which dependence children become addicted, and thus 
enslaved. On the other side, there is the dependence wrought by the 
exorbitant expectations exacted on their developing imaginations, so that their 
lack in power and preparation leaves them dumbfounded at the site of their 
failures. Rather than equip our young with more effective means for survival, 
we abandon them to their instincts and leave them no resort other than to 
survive with the aid of what limited skills they may happen to possess at their 
particular stage of development. And survive they shall, though at times 
resorting to a kind of apathy that shelters them from an extra-subjective 
existence, or by means of the video games that facilitate their indifference – 
that train them in the art of not caring or in not having to understand why 
they might care. 
Educating the democratic animal 
Dewey further expands on Rousseau’s sentiments with the idea that con-
sidering the infant’s needs does not entail relinquishing authority over her. As 
                             
25   See, Tom Lickona and Matt Davidson. Smart & Good High Schools: Integrating Excellence and 
Ethics for Success in School, Work, and Beyond. Cortland, N.Y.: Center for the 4th and 5th R’s (Re-
spect & Responsibility)/Washington, D.C.: Character Education Partnership (2005). 
www.cortland.edu/character/highschool, retrieved May 2008. 
26   Little-league baseball players are having surgeries to repair their overused arms as parents and 
coaches force these children to play in an inordinate number of games and throw pitches the force 
and torque of which the musculature and bone structure of their young arms are not yet strong 
enough to withstand. See documentary, “America’s Newest Arms Race,” HBO Real Sports with 
Bryant Gumbel, aired April 2005.   81
Dewey reminds us, “The wise mother takes account of the needs of the infant 
but not in a way which dispenses with her own responsibility for regulating 
the objective conditions under which the needs are satisfied.”
27 This concern 
for regulation suggests an important criterion according to which we deter-
mine whether instruction is beneficial to the child’s development, because it is 
within the caregiver’s power to regulate the objective conditions that will 
“influence directly the experience of others and thereby [place] upon him the 
duty of determining that environment which will interact with the existing 
capacities and needs of those taught to create a worth-while experience.”
28 
Furthermore, Dewey suggests that it is by succeeding at certain tasks that 
we progressively hone in on, fine-tune, and reshape our dispositions – experi-
ence growth—and thereby give new meaning to our subsequent experience.
29 
Habits are reshaped in the processes by which we learn something new – 
what Dewey means when he equates the adaptation of habits with learning or 
growth. Dewey scholar Thomas Alexander describes this dynamic trait of a 
habit as part of a process of learning, whereby “the habit itself expands and 
grows as it tries to adapt to the new circumstances so that the domain of 
organized responses develops; a premonition of the growth of meaning in 
experience.
30 Our habits form the axis around which the dance of learning 
revolves. Habit centers our experiences, providing our impulses a harbor from 
which to venture in new directions and a place to return with new information 
to be used once again in the continuous reshaping of experience and future 
impulse.
31 
Though Dewey is clearly supportive of the free expression of natural im-
pulses, nevertheless they must be guided by intelligent purpose. Unguided 
impulse too easily turns to misguided energy, which may lead to negative, if 
not disastrous, results. The mistake of equating “freedom with immediate 
execution of impulses and desires,” Dewey attributes to a “confusion of im-
pulse with purpose.”
32 For Dewey, purpose implies intelligent direction of our 
impulses and desires, which in turn requires thoughtful action. Thinking 
checks our impulses and desires, until further understanding directs their en-
ergies toward some more enabling purpose or aim. As a result, “the intellec-
tual anticipation, the idea of consequences, [blends] with desire and impulse 
                             
27   Dewey (1938), pp. 41-2. 
28   Ibid. p. 45. 
29   Eric Jensen, whose approaches to teaching and learning are based on many of the latest findings 
from the neurosciences, concludes that, “The single best way to grow a better brain is through 
challenging problem solving, [which] creates new dendritic connections.” In Teaching with the 
Brain in Mind. Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (1998), p. 
35. 
30   Alexander (1987), p. 136. 
31   Dewey (1922), p. 67. 
32   Dewey (1938), p. 45.   82
to acquire moving force. It then gives direction to what otherwise is blind, 
while desire gives ideas impetus and momentum.”
33 
Meanwhile, helping a child understand that self-control realized in the 
process of thinking is not an affront to freedom, but rather that invoking 
thought is what one ought to do precisely in those moments when thought is 
most necessary – when we face the risks from allowing our blind impulses and 
desires to direct our actions – is an important step towards a self-directed life. 
Dewey suggests we use the energy from the child’s impulses as the fuel that 
drives the engine of learning, as we steer these toward purpose, that is, to-
ward intelligent action. Consequently, the child does not see her freedom 
opposed or thwarted, which then presents a further opportunity for her to 
view her own experience as appreciated and, therefore, meaningful. 
If properly tended, the folds of experiential ambiguity give rise to order 
and solace, which together represent our rational and emotional efforts to 
navigate the dynamic interplay of learning – the give-and-take between free-
dom and control, impulse and habit, initiative and instruction, the playfulness 
with which life lessons are made palatable and the toughness and resilience 
with which they must be endured. The mistake of many parents and educa-
tors is found in the way in which they utilize outward freedom as license for 
the inchoate expressions of children’s desires and impulses, rather than as an 
impetus for self-reflection on the purposes of their actions. Genuine freedom 
has to mean more. It has to mean action that is both intentionally guided by 
intelligent purpose and personally meaningful to the individual acting. 
The most important, if not the most obvious reason for exercising such 
control comes from sheer necessity. It is an inevitable fact of our human con-
dition that each of us must confront the challenges of life. We must then be as 
best prepared as possible to do what is within our power to bring about the 
highest quality of life possible. And, since ultimately all of us must do this for 
ourselves, our ability to do so must be properly formed. The individual most 
capable of exercising self-control, that is, of demonstrating self-discipline, is 
the one best suited to autonomously direct his or her life. Therefore, the task 
of educating children to direct their own lives is not only necessary for their 
continued existence, but also indispensable to the goal of achieving personal 
happiness. 
Furthermore, and just as crucial, the consent by which we agree upon the 
goals or ends we deem appropriate for ourselves individually provides the very 
democratic basis by which we establish the rules or laws that circumscribe 
the realization of those goals or ends socially. Locke writes, “For law, in its 
true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelli-
gent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no further than is for the gen-
eral good of those under that law.” In other words, accepting self-rule means 
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that the establishment of law and social order is not a matter of imposition 
from an authority emanating beyond our selves for, as Locke goes on to say in 
the same passage, “the end of law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve 
and enlarge freedom.”
 34 
This idea is not much different from that later developed in Immanuel 
Kant’s attempt to reconcile the readily held opposition between duty and per-
sonal fulfillment. In his formulation of the third practical principle of morality – 
the principle of autonomy (the first refers to the universality of moral law, 
while the second relates to the recognition of all rational beings as ends in 
themselves) – Kant proposes it is our ability to rationally self-legislate or self-
impose moral laws, which ultimately binds us to universal moral laws. Kant 
writes, 
According to this principle all maxims are rejected which are not consistent with 
the will’s own legislation of universal law. The will is thus not merely subject to 
the law but is subject to the law in such a way that it must be regarded also as 
legislating for itself and only on this account as being subject to the law (of which 
it can regard itself as the author).
35 
It is Kant’s hope that we recognize the very basis of morality lies in our 
ability to unite that which reason informs us is in our best interest with that 
which we are obligated to do. Therefore, obligations need not be construed as 
burdens, limitations, or impediments to free activity, but rather as what we 
rationally will for our own fulfillment. 
What, then, constitutes the education of the democratic citizen? It in-
cludes, minimally, honing the individual’s capability to rationally direct his or 
her own life, and to do so with full autonomy—as a self-directing individual 
who is able to define and realize his or her own goals. At the same time, the 
liberty with which one directs one’s actions must in certain respects be kept 
in check, so as to render one’s liberty and autonomy amenable to concerns for 
the social welfare of one’s society. This requires from an early age a continu-
ous and dynamic balance between self-control and the autonomy and free 
expression of the individual. So much of Locke’s educational philosophy rests 
on striking this balance that he refers to its achievement as the “true secret” 
and “great art” of education.
36 Notice that for Locke this relationship between 
our freedom and self-control is only a “seeming” contradiction. For to exercise 
our reason for the purpose of guiding action means simply engaging in a proc-
ess of thinking according to which we ascertain the possible ramifications of 
                             
34   Locke (1952), p. 32. 
35   Kant (1981), Section 431, p. 38. 
36   Locke writes: “To avoid the danger that is on either hand is the great art; and he that has found a 
way how to keep up a child’s spirit easy, active, and free, and yet at the same time to restrain him 
from many things he has a mind to, and to draw him to those things that are uneasy to him; he, I 
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bringing our impulses and desires to fruition. In turn, this allows us to accom-
plish two important ends: one benefiting us individually, the other socially. 
First, the ability to exercise control over one’s impulses and desires means 
that one does not become a slave to these. After all, not all desires are equally 
worthy. Though pursuit of some may be beneficial, the pursuit of others may 
oftentimes lead to our demise. A basic problem we seem to have in exercising 
self-control has much to do with our very conception of it as an opposition to 
freedom. An age-old and still prevalent misconception identifies freedom with 
license—the ability to do as we please regardless of any other consideration, 
and doing all that we desire to do for the simple reason that we desire to do it. 
Contrary to what an individual holding such a view of freedom may believe, 
this does not make us free. Rather, it makes us less free. By unquestioningly 
following our desires we become slaves to those very desires, since we 
thereby allow these to dictate our lives. We think ourselves free, yet we are 
not in control of our lives because we lack self-control. 
Secondly, the more we exercise self-control, which necessarily entails at 
least a provisional suspension of our immediate impulses, interests, or desires, 
the greater chance that we are able to make the kinds of decisions that take 
into account the needs and interests of others. Ideally, others may be led to 
carry out the same process, which ultimately is beneficial to us all. Dewey, 
writing on the role of schools in bringing about social progress, echoes 
Locke’s sentiments when he states “the art of thus giving shape to human 
powers and adapting them to social service, is the supreme art.”
37 Douglas 
Simpson spells out the nuances of Dewey’s contention, which, along with 
certain “powers” also requires a penchant for selflessness. He writes: 
Dewey’s particular interpretation of education is that it is vitally related to adapt-
ing human abilities for social service. Students need to develop a view of life that 
helps them get beyond personal interests and consider the interests of others. 
Their developed abilities, perceptions, and sensitivities should be adapted to meet 
the needs of society, including promoting a culture that takes into consideration 
the importance of people living democratically.
38 
Thus, in accordance with the exigencies of a democratic social vision, 
limitations must be placed upon individuals’ pursuit of desire for desire’s sake, 
all the while respecting the individual’s autonomy. 
This is not to imply that desires are in and of themselves detrimental to 
the achievement of democracy. Rather, democracy simply requires that indi-
viduals be discerning when it comes to that which is desired. With an air of 
Aristotelianism, Locke reminds us that specifically with children “the having of 
desires accommodated to the apprehensions and relish of those several ages, 
is not the fault; but the not having them subject to the rules and restraints of 
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reason: the difference lies not in having or not having appetites, but in the 
power to govern, and deny ourselves in them.”
39 In other words, it is not de-
sires that in and of themselves cause problems for human action; rather it is 
the unintelligent expression they are allowed that wreaks havoc on our affairs 
and makes us no different than the brutes. Exercising reason to contend with 
this effect provides us with greater opportunities for making the kinds of deci-
sions that increase both our personal freedom and our chances for achieving 
an amicable and prosperous social existence. 
As the vital instrument by which we arrive at self-discipline, according to 
Locke, one’s ability to reason must be trained and developed as early as pos-
sible. But children’s curiosities must be kept in check, hence the need for a 
continuous balance between freedom and control. At first, owing to their 
sheer lack of experience, habits to be developed in children must be firmly 
guided by the reasoning and example of adults. Unfortunately, being under the 
tutelage of adults is no guarantee against more harm being caused than good, 
as is the case with parents who indulge their children by either allowing their 
curiosities to go unchecked (over-permissiveness) or vigorously restricting 
these at every turn (over-protectionism). These two expressions of overindul-
gence on the part of parents and teachers, together work to absolve the child 
of any need to think on his or her own and undermine the deliberative proc-
ess. 
Conclusion 
Although children ought to be respected, it is almost certainly true that 
due to sheer inexperience they simply lack the capabilities necessary to make 
adequate sense of their circumstances. For Locke, the parent who remains 
focused on the goal of discipline, even when required to deploy stern meas-
ures, in effect demonstrates a greater concern for the child’s interest and wel-
fare than the parent who spoils.
40 Instead of recognizing the importance of the 
                             
39   Locke (1947), p. 231. 
40   Although critical of regular and excessive corporal punishment (CP), Locke is not entirely opposed 
to its use; in particular when unruliness compromises the goal of discipline and the development of 
the child’s autonomy. At the same time, Locke holds firm to the belief that “great severity of pun-
ishment does but very little good, nay, great harm in education; and that those children who have 
been most chastised, seldom make the best men” (Op. cit., 1947), pp. 236-7. Murray A. Straus & 
Denise A. Donnelly, echo Locke’s intuitions with the aid of empirical studies. The authors find that 
approximately ninety-percent of parents use some form of corporal punishment (CP) on toddlers. CP 
is defined as the use of physical force with the intention of inflicting or causing pain, but not injury, 
for the purposes of correction and control. Although a common rationale for CP revolves around ef-
forts to curb anti-social behavior, there is evidence that it actually increases the likelihood of anti-
social behavior at a later age. Toddlers who are spanked are more likely to be aggressive with their 
kindergarten peers. CP experienced during adolescence is associated with an increased likelihood 
of approving violence against one’s spouse or siblings, experiencing depression as an adult, elevat-
ing levels of marital conflict, physical assault on other adults, physical abuse of children, masochis-
tic sexual behavior, and alienation. See, Murray A. Straus & Denise A. Donnelly, Beating the Devil   86
end, parents focus on the means literally at hand, and give in to their chil-
dren’s whims and impulses or crush any semblance of their autonomy. By this 
very concession, parents themselves become poor examples of self-discipline 
and initiative, respectively. Furthermore, neither form of overindulgence gets 
us any closer to achieving democracy according to its minimal criteria of 
autonomy and a spirit of social cooperation. 
In their dealings with the everyday obstacles, frustrations, and challenges 
before them, children must be allowed the freedom to learn from the conse-
quences of both their successes and failures. Tough lessons to learn and les-
sons that require toughness to teach are valuable lessons parents and teachers 
today all too often run from, by doing everything they can to avoid even the 
slightest hint of conflict, frustration, or pain.
41 Rousseau suggests we allow 
natural consequences to do their part, make their impact, and have their ef-
fect. Incidentally, the freedom and playfulness that characterize Rousseau’s 
oft-misunderstood pedagogy require a complementary habit of resilience with 
which to face life’s more arduous and painful lessons. Yet, exploratory play is 
more frequently missing from the new arenas of childhood, where games are 
highly structured, supervised, and even professionalized to the point where 
personal gratification becomes irrelevant.
42 Missing from these more techni-
cally sophisticated forms of play are opportunities for children to hone the 
skills needed for resolving their own conflicts and disputes, not to mention lost 
opportunities to earn a sense of personal achievement, as more and more par-
ents live vicariously through their children’s play. 
It is imperative to the pursuit of happiness that children perceive their les-
sons as necessary to their own development – lessons that seem to flow from 
and lead naturally toward the satisfaction of their real needs. But to satisfy 
children’s needs does not mean that their desires and supplications ought to 
be overindulged. Parents who spoil their children surreptitiously undermine 
their autonomy by overriding it, which is tantamount to imposing upon them 
the severest of restrictions on their freedom to do as they see fit for them-
selves. As we have seen, by freedom, philosophers of education throughout 
the modern period do not intend the vulgarity of opportunism we commonly 
mistake as indulgence. Rather, they intend the freedom that allows children to 
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Transactions Pub. [1994] (2001). 
41   According to Alfie Kohn, conflict is perceived by teachers as a kind of “dandruff”—“something 
unsightly to be eliminated as rapidly as possible.” Alfie Kohn, Beyond Discipline: From Compliance 
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42   We have gone as far as “criminalizing play,” author Richard Louv concludes in his Last Child in the 
Woods: Saving Our Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder. Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books (2005). 
Also, Brooke Adams reports on the “real costs for children” of being kept from play: “diminished 
use of senses, attention difficulties and higher rates of physical and emotional illness.” In “Go Play 
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explore their impulses in order to discover and properly gauge the require-
ments of their own needs and interests, as well as their own in relation to the 
wellbeing of others. 
Rousseau’s Emile, for instance, learns to “count on himself alone” and is 
in possession of “a precise and unprejudiced mind; he is satisfied, happy, and 
free.”
43 Emile is independent and self-sufficient, and steadfast in those deci-
sions that help ensure his wellbeing. Having been made free first by being 
taught to yield to necessity, he never loses sight of what it means to be his 
own person—a freedom he carries in his heart and thus “takes with him eve-
rywhere.”
44 Emile’s upbringing is the basis and backdrop of his happiness. 
When we think of child abuse, we think of physical, psychological, and 
emotional harm brought deliberately upon a child. Such harm is typically 
thought to have the effect of impairing or incapacitating the child’s develop-
ment – of somehow enfeebling the child’s potential. The possibility of happi-
ness and, dare I say, a democratic form of life, requires of us a kind of rational 
and emotional dexterity and acumen that helps establish the very conditions 
for personal empowerment necessary in our pursuit of such a way of life. The 
deliberate distraction from the development of these requisite powers consti-
tutes, I believe, a disguised form of child abuse. 
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